{"product_id":"scientific-models-in-philosophy-of-science-paperback","title":"Scientific Models in Philosophy of Science - Paperback","description":"\u003cp\u003eby \u003cb\u003eDaniela M. Bailer-Jones\u003c\/b\u003e (Author)\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eScientists have used models for hundreds of years as a means of describing phenomena and as a basis for further analogy. In \u003ci\u003eScientific Models in Philosophy of Science, \u003c\/i\u003e Daniela Bailer-Jones assembles an original and comprehensive philosophical analysis of how models have been used and interpreted in both historical and contemporary contexts. \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e Bailer-Jones delineates the many forms models can take (ranging from equations to animals; from physical objects to theoretical constructs), and how they are put to use. She examines early mechanical models employed by nineteenth-century physicists such as Kelvin and Maxwell, describes their roots in the mathematical principles of Newton and others, and compares them to contemporary mechanistic approaches. Bailer-Jones then views the use of analogy in the late nineteenth century as a means of understanding models and to link different branches of science. She reveals how analogies can also be models themselves, or can help to create them. \u003cp\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e The first half of the twentieth century saw little mention of models in the literature of logical empiricism. Focusing primarily on theory, logical empiricists believed that models were of temporary importance, flawed, and awaiting correction. The later contesting of logical empiricism, particularly the hypothetico-deductive account of theories, by philosophers such as Mary Hesse, sparked a renewed interest in the importance of models during the 1950s that continues to this day. \u003cp\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e Bailer-Jones analyzes subsequent propositions of: models as metaphors; Kuhn's concept of a paradigm; the Semantic View of theories; and the case study approaches of Cartwright and Morrison, among others. She then engages current debates on topics such as phenomena versus data, the distinctions between models and theories, the concepts of representation and realism, and the discerning of falsities in models.\u003cbr\u003e\u003ch3\u003eAuthor Biography\u003c\/h3\u003e\u003cp\u003eDaniela M. Bailer-Jones taught philosophy of science at the University of Paderborn, the University of Bonn, and the University of Heidelberg, and was a member of the editorial board of \u003ci\u003eInternational Studies in the Philosophy of Science.\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\n\u003cstrong\u003eNumber of Pages:\u003c\/strong\u003e 248\u003c\/div\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\n\u003cstrong\u003eDimensions:\u003c\/strong\u003e 0.57 x 8.49 x 5.6 IN\u003c\/div\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\n\u003cstrong\u003ePublication Date:\u003c\/strong\u003e July 15, 2013\u003c\/div\u003e","brand":"Books by splitShops","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":47450092437682,"sku":"9780822962731","price":89.1,"currency_code":"USD","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0770\/3891\/1666\/files\/c6f41a93ae7ad979a81c5bcc2420246d.webp?v=1778779999","url":"https:\/\/box.dadyminds.org\/products\/scientific-models-in-philosophy-of-science-paperback","provider":"DADYMINDS BOX","version":"1.0","type":"link"}